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EDITORIALS 
AN INTRODUCTION 
Welcome to The Colonial Lawyer. For those readers 
meeting it for the first time, perhaps a note of introduc-
tion is in order. First as a newspaper, and since 1969 as 
a magazine, the Lawyer has served Marshall-Wythe as a 
forum for student thought on the law school and the 
law. For the past year the Lawyer has been, as it were, 
"on vacation." Now it is back. 
Diversity is the objective of the Lawyer, and the con-
tents of this issue exemplify that goal. Two articles follow 
an environmental vein. The first, a guest article by Mr. 
Denis Brion, traces the development of the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments. Mr. Brion, 
who this year joined the faculty of Marshall-Wythe, is the 
present president of the Virginia State Water Control 
Board, a body that has been unusually visible to the 
public eye this year because of its responsibility to 
investigate first the Kepone scandal and later the Great 
Chesapeake Bay Oil spill. 
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Control Act Amendments 
-Denis J. Brion 
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Also on the environmental side, John L Carver, the 
Secretary-Treasurer of The Environmental Law Group at 
Marshall-Wythe and the editor-in-chief of that organiza-
tion's publication The Environmental Practice News, 
examines the possibility of "Thermal Efficiency Stan-
dards For Buildings." 
Three articles in this issue have in common a concern 
for the problems that arise when law attempts to deal 
with morality. Ingrid Hillinger considers the problems of 
"The Duty to Rescue," while R. Gregory Barton takes a 
fresh look at "The Morality of Suicide." Mark Horos-
chak, in his turn, contributes a study on "Positive 
Eugenics and the Law." 
On a practical note, Kathleen Nixon's article: "Semi-
Student Bargaining" delves into the timely issue of the 
rights of graduate teaching assistants and medical in-
terns and residents to bargain collectively for higher pay. 
Finally, on the lighter side. Jane Bedno finds poetry 
in the justice that defines women's "place" under the 
law. 
We think you will find it interesting. 
CHANGES 
With this issue, The Colonial Lawyer begins a new 
chapter in its history. While outwardly little changed 
from past issues, internally the Lawyer has undergone a 
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revolution in concept. Those of us most intimately con-
cerned with the change view it with mixed emotions. We 
believe that it may be a great step forward for the 
publication. but our hopes are tempered by the know-
ledge that no such drastic reorganization should ever 
have been necessary. 
There is an ennui in this school that sometimes threa-
tens even the most viable organizations. Time and again 
those students attempting to organize some ambitious 
project for the benefit of the school at large find them-
selves hamstrung by the lack of support from their 
fellows. Be the effort a one-time speaker presentation or 
a continuing project such as the Lswyer. it is crippled by 
this disinterest. 
In 1975 a staffing crisis nearly terminated The Colonisl 
Lswyer. In an effort to save it. members of four special 
interest groups: The Environmental Law Group The Black 
American Law Students Association (BALSA). The Mary 
and William Society and The International Law Society 
joined to serve as the Lswyer's staff. Consequently. this 
magazine is now operated under an agreement that 
allows these groups to use it as their voice and as a 
vehicle for articles concerning their particular spheres of 
interest. 
This is not to say that The Colonisl Lswyer does not 
remain a basically independent publication. Essentially 
there is now a quid pro quo arrangement whereby these 
groups will provide active support for the Lswyer in 
return for an opportunity to express their views through 
it. Otherwise the magazine's content is determined by its 
editor and staff who may not necessarily be affiliated 
with any of these groups. 
We feel that. through service as a voice of these 
interest groups at Marshall-Wythe. The Colonisl Lswyer 
is embarking upon a new path of service. Nevertheless. 
we cannot but be saddened by the knowledge that it was 
not a voluntary decision that led to this move. but rather 
an effort of desperation to save the Lswyer from dying of 
indifference. 
The virtue of a magazine like the Lswyer is that it 
serves as a forum for· many diverse themes and forms of 
expression. Neither day-to-day topicality nor stringent 
technicality need restrict its format. For the reader. 
perhaps more than any other law school publicati.Jn a 
magazine serves as a window into the thoughts of his 
fellow students. We of The Coloniel lswyer staff hope 
that our publicaton's "vacations" are over and that. in 
the future. the student body of Marshall-Wythe will 
support it and wield it as a valuable tool of expression. 
-Terry N. Grinnalds 
THE DEMISE UI" ACTIVISM: 
BAD NEWS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 
Unheralded. unannounced. and without warning. 
events have transpired which bode ill for the future of the 
campaign for 8 quality environment for America. Subtle 
subjective indicators lead to the conclusion that the 
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environmental movement is in danger of foundering. 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that environ-
mental enthusiasm has abated. In the early days of the 
"new environmental awareness." groups proliferated. It 
was "in" and fashionable to talk about the environment. 
People who did not know what "environment" meant 
flocked to the "Earth Day" demonstrations. Thera was 
an environmental franzy which promised not only new 
legislation. but also attitudinal changes among the public 
at large. During this period. the concern with the quality 
of life seemed to blossom. and the environmental 
movement had basically a positive image. 
Today. however.-it is not "in" tei be-environmentally 
active. The zealous emotionalism of earlier days (which 
may have led to some abuses by conservationists) has 
been supplanted by "ho hum" establishment procedures 
for the protection of the environment. Today those not 
working through establishment channels are suspect 
and. by-in-Iarge. are cast in a negative light. The 
remaining activists are considered radical rabblerousers 
who lie in wait to oppose any or everything. 
The large industrial polluters. who were the villains in 
the early days of the environmental crusade. have suc-
cessfully changed their images. Currently in all forms of 
media. we see 8 succession of advertisements which 
remind the American public what Exxon. General Mo-
tors. or some other corporate giant is doing to protect the 
environment. Power companies. oil companies and 
others have successfully portrayed environmental ac-
tivists as being anti-affluence. anti-American (the Amer-
ican athic is basad on growth). and anti-progress. The 
miseries of the recant recession are even portrayed as 
evidence of the danger of environmental negativism I 
This coup by industrial. expansionist. "anti-anvironmen-
tal" forces is now driving activism to near extinction. 
What remains after activism has lost its popularity are 
those of us who continue to fight the long tedious lagal 
battles against almost insurmountable odds. The cor-
porate forces now command legions of highly paid and 
experienced environmental (or anti-environmental7) at-
torneys. These same corporate forces support a huge. 
well-financed lobby and public relations campaign. 
Through such efforts. the "anti-environmentalists" have 
either neutralized public opinion or have swung it to their 
side. At best today one can hope that the public is only 
apathetic. 
In the face of all this Madison Avenue profeSSionalism. 
the uncoordinated. ill-financed forces of the environ-
mentalists have little spirit or morale left. Activism is 
dying. and the environmental movement is foundering 
Activism must not die. Those who in these times dog-
gedly wage unpopular battles recognize that. while 
activism has its excesses and is sometimes even 
counter-productive. its spark is what keeps the environ-
mental movement vital. 
-John L. Carver 
AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT OF 
THE 
1972 FEDERAL WATER 
POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS 
Denis J. Brion 
It is becoming a part of the conventional wisdom that 
the national legislative process has undergone substan-
tial degeneration-under the typical pattern, Congress 
creates, with considerable fanfare, an ambitious federal 
program in order to cure one or another of the social ills 
which plague our times. Next comes a ritual bill-signing 
ceremony during which the President intones that this 
particular program is the most significant of our genera-
tion. There then follows a period during which, again 
with the attention of the news media, prominent in-
dividuals are appointed to the top positions in the new 
bureaucracy. This phase is inevitably followed by the 
setting in of a long period of bureaucratic routine, under 
which the program continues because of its momentum, 
with expanding funding but with no real impact on the 
problem for which the program was created. To the 
average citizen, the whole process seems to be one of 
cumulation-new programs are constantly being creat-
ed, old programs continue, no program seems to solve 
anything, and the burden of government seems ever to 
increase. It has reached the point that the traditional 
conservative battle cry against big government is now 
being echoed in the opposing camps. Edmund Muskie, 
for instance, is now wondering whether the largeness of 
government is hampering the ability of government to do 
its job. And Edmund Brown, Jr., is past the stage of 
wondering; he is actively advocating a reduction in the 
size of government. 
The purpose of this article is not to examine the nature 
of this trend, nor is it to comment on the efficiency of the 
political process. Rather it is to assess, however briefly 
within the context of this new conventional wisdom, the 
nature of one ambitious federal program, its impact 
nationwide as well as in Virginia, and some of its 
prospects. 
A. A Brief Description of the '972 Amendments 
In October, 1972, Congress enacted the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,. a com-
prehensive rewriting and expansion of an existing federal 
pollution abatement statue. These amendments, com-
monly referred to by their Public Law number, Pl 
92-500, set ultimate goels for achieving the cleanup'of 
America's watercourses. By July 1, 1977, industrial 
discharges must be treated by treatment works using 
"the best practicable control technology currently 
available," and municipal sewage treatment works must 
be capable of "secondary treatment." By July 1, 1983, 
industrial waste treatment works must be capable of "the 
best available technology economically achievable," and 
municipal sewage treatment works must achieve "the 
best practicable waste treatment technology." 
What all this euphonious language is intended to mean 
is that, by July 1, 1983, "an interim goel of water 
quality which provides for the protection and propaga-
tion of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for 
recreation in and on the water" is to be achieved; and, by 
1985, "the national goel that the discharge of pollutants 
into the navigable waters be eliminated" is to be 
achieved. In brief, these goels represent a truly ambitious 
commitment to reversing the generations-long process of 
the degredation of the waterways of America-an enter-
prise worthy in comparison to the most grandiose 
government programs that have been initiated in the two 
centuries of our republic. 
The mechanisms of Pl 92-500 are as complex as the 
intent is massive. The heart of the enactment is the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES), which sets up a regulatory mechanism based 
on the concept of federal-state cooperation. Under 
NPDES, all persons who potentially might discharge 
pollutants must obtain a discharge permit; "persons" 
includes both private entities, such as industries, and 
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public entities, such as municipalities. The NPDES per-
mits are issued under direct regulatory programs estab-
lished and carried out by the individual states. However, 
these individual programs are approved in advance by 
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and 
the substantive content of the programs is controlled by 
regulations promulgated by EPA. The authority of EPA to 
issue these various regulations and guidelines creates for 
that agency a role of setting standards, in which it 
establishes tolerable levels of various kinds of pollutants, 
treatment standards, levels of quality for. receiving 
waters, and procedural requirements. And, because EPA 
must approve the individual state programs and is em-
powered to withdraw this approval, EPA also fills the role 
of overseer. 
Other hardly less important provisions of Pl 92-500 
provide for a comprehensive scheme of state planning 
carried out under federal guidelines and assisted by 
federal grant funds; for substantial research and 
development to be conducted by EPA in waste treatment 
technology; and for a broad enforcement scheme. The 
complex scheme of planning includes river basin plans, 
which are to describe present water quality conditions 
and to project future conditions and treatment require-
ments; management plans, which are to establish the 
means by which these treatment requirements are to be 
met; and a more sophisticated level of planning for the 
purpose of defining and establishing means to abate less 
obvious but no less important forms of pollution such as 
storm water rllnoft from urban areas, siltation from land 
areas disturbed by development, and runoff of nu-
trient-laden waters from heavily-fertilized agricultural 
lands. The enforcement scheme of Pl 92-500 is carried 
out primarily by the individual states, but the EPA has 
broad residual authority to step into any faltering state 
process; and a relatively generous citizen suit provision is 
also included. 
If the heart of Pl 92-500 is NPDES, the prime mover 
is the federal fund grantmg process under which EPA 
provides 75% of the costs of public sewage treatment 
works. Pl 92-500 authorized a total of $18 billion for 
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such purposes, spread over fiscal years 1972, 1973, 
and 1974; and despite a delay because of a presidential 
impoundment of a large' portion of the funds (which 
impoundment was struck down by the courts), the mon-
ey has been made available and will soon be substan-
tially spent. 
These funds are parceled out in a complicated 
procedure under which the individual states are required 
to adopt a rating system for assessing priorities of 
potential fund recipients, followed by a three-stage 
process under which the various projects, once selected 
far funding, are moved from inception through the 
design phase to completion. 
Finally, Pl 92-500 established a "National Study 
Commission," charged with the duty to 
make a full and complete investigation and study of all of 
the technological aspects of echieving. and all aspects of 
the total economic. social. and environmental effects of 
achieving or not achieving. the effluent limitations and 
goals set forth for 1983 in. . . this Act. 
Thus, the National Study Commission was charged with 
the duty to make its report by September, 1975, in order 
to permit "mid-<:ourse corrections." Pl 92-500 carries 
with it no irrebuttable presumption that it is the end-all; 
rather, a mechanism is instead established to compare 
goals with performance and to reassess the wisdom of 
continued pursuit of those goals. 
This somewhat long summary of Pl92-500 is actually 
only a simplified overview-the print of the Act covers 
eighty-nine prolix pages, and it is one of the most 
complex pieces of legislation ever to come out of Con-
gress at one time. 
B. The Interim Report of the 
National Study Commission 
The obvious question,of course, is whether such a 
monstrosity can really work. The staft report of the 
National Study Commission was issued in November, 
1975, and the recommendations of the Commission 
became available in March, 1976. The findings of the 
Commission are interesting. On a nationwide basis, the 
commission found that publicly owned sewage treatment 
works will not meet the July 1, 1977, deadline for 
secondary treatment, primarily because not enough 
federal grant funds have been made available. The 
Commission estimates that an additional eleven years 
and $118.5 billion in 75% federal grants will be 
required. Similarly, the July 1, 1977, goal for industrial 
discharges will not be met, but the industries are ex-
pected to meet this goal much sooner-by 1980-than 
the 1988 completion date for public treatment works. 
Moreover, the report concludes that there has already 
been noticeable improvement, generally, in water quality 
conditions. 
C. Progress in Virginia under PL 92-500 
In Virginia, for a variety of reasons, the institutional 
ingredients have long existed for taking advantage of the 
initiatives available under PL 92-500. In 1946, more 
than a generation ago, Virginia established one of the 
first water pollution regulatory agencies, for the ironic 
purpose of attracting more industry to the Common-
wealth. With a relatively vigorous response to PL 
92-500, Virginia has been able to obtain a total of $496 
million of the authorized grant funds for municipal 
treatment facility construction: 
Fiscal Year 1973 $ 58 million 
Fiscal Year 1974 $ 88 million 
Fiscal Year 1975 $ 99 million 
Fiscal Year 1976 $251 million 
Since the federal grant pays for 75% of project cost, the 
total project value initiated in Virginia under PL 92-500 
is $661 million, a not insubstantial public works invest-
ment by any measure, and a prodigious undertaking for 
an environmental endeavor. Nor is this the only impres-
sive feature that can be offered. I n terms of physical 
facilities in place, these funds will represent the initial 
construction or improvement of municipal treatment 
works with a combined total capacity of approximately 
390 million gallons per day (MGD). Stated differently, 
using a rule of thumb of 90 gallons of sewage per day 
generated per capita and a total Virginia populaton of 
about 5 million, these funds have a direct impact on the 
waste of 89% of Virginia's populaton. This figure is even 
more substantial when it is considered that a certain 
portion of the population is too dispersed to be served by 
centralized facilities. 
The types of facilities being provided under these 
projects cover a broad spectrum of treatment techniques 
and treatment capacity. They range from a simple central 
septic system for the tiny Roanoke Valley community of 
Boones Mill to advanced, most-sophisticated-in-the-
country tertiary treatment plants at Roanoke, Charlottes-
ville, Winchester, Waynesboro, Alexandria, Arlington, 
eastern Fairfax County, and Prince William County. The 
largest of these tertiary plants will have a capacity of 54 . 
MGD and the combined total capacity of 214 MGD, a 
capability to serve 48% of the population of the com-
monwealth. In addition, several antiquated treatment 
plants in the Hampton Roads area are being substantially 
upgraded, three newer plants are being expanded in 
capability to meet increasing loads, and three entirely 
new facilities are in various stages of planning. The total 
capacity for the Hampton Roads area facilities will be 
180 MGD. 
Of course, the large-scale projects in Virginia's urban 
areas are the most visible, but the important point is that 
the treatment requirements and stream standards im-
posed under NPDES affect all of the Commonwealth, not 
just the urban concentrations. Thus, on a per capita 
basis, the requirements are substantially uniform, and 
the resident of a small community will feel the impact of 
PL 92-500 just as much as the resident of the large city. 
What is the nature of this impact? The first aspect is 
obviously financial. The $496 million is not "free", since 
it comes from the taxpayer's pocket. although there is 
some reason to believe that Virginia has wangled a bit of 
a "subsidy". In terms of size and popUlation, Virginia is 
an "average" state and would thus have expected to 
receive about 1 150, or $360 million, of the $18 billion 
authorized by PL 92-500. The $496 million actually 
received thus can be looked on as· containing a 38% 
bonus. But, from another point of view, this federal 
largess is also not free since these treatment systems 
will not run themselves; for the indefinite future, they will 
demand funds for operetion and maintenance that will 
have a permanent effect on the utility bills of the averege 
citizen. 
If the cost of this program is substantial. what of the 
benefits? The statistics available to date indicate: 
a. from December 1972 to December 1975, the 
allowable total flow discharge from Virginia's major 
municipal sewage treatment plants (defined as those 
with a capacity of 2 MGD or more) as increased from 
345 MGD to 424 MGD, a 23% increase; and 
b. in the same period, the total pollutant discharge 
from these facilities has decreased from 165,000 
pounds of BOD per day (a technical measure of pollutant 
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quantity) to 120,000 pounds of BOD per day, a 27% 
decrease. The performance in this same period for Vir-
ginia's major industrial treatment plants shows similar 
improvement. 
While a 27% decrease in pollutant load is solid pro-
gress but still not all that spectacular, it should be noted 
that only about 5% of the projects funded by PL 92-500 
have been completed; and, while much of this im-
provement could also be attributed to more vigorous 
enforcement of Virginia's water pollution abatement 
program, there is little question that the financial, as 
opposed to regulatory, aspects of PL 92-500 are begin-
ning to take effect. It is projected that, when the projects 
funded by the $496 million federal grants are completed 
in 1979, the pollutant discharge from Virginia's major 
sewerage treatment plants will be some 90,000 pounds 
of BOD per day, a reduction of 45% from December 
1972, even though the permitted flow will be 600 MGD, 
a 74% increase over the same period. 
Finally, if the polhJtant load being discharged into 
Virginia's waters is decreasing, what will be the effect on 
the quality of Virginia's waters-which, after all, is the 
whole point of the pollution abatement exercise? The 
information and projectons now available assuming a 
continuing federal grant program, indicate this: 
Year Stream-miles not % of total 
meeting quality Virginia stream 
criteria miles 
1974 2033 8.4% 
1977 1435 5.3% 
1983 96 0.4% 
These figures are particularly significant since the 
process of setting water quality criteria for the streams of 
Virginia is a continuing one, and the tendency over time 
is for these standards to become more stringent. Thus, 
Virginia's waters are on their way to being cleansed. 
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D. The Future of PL 92-500 
The National Study Commission has concluded that 
the 1977, 1983 and 1984 goals of PL 92-500 cannot 
be met on time. In Virginia alone, there is another $1 
billion worth of municipal projects that must be funded if 
these goals are to be met. And much further work must 
also be done in abating non-poi nt-discharges and toxic 
pollution. Unfortunately, the fiscal authorizations under 
PL 92-500 have run out, and the President's current 
budget requests provide for no additional funds. At this 
writing there is substantial sentiment within Congress to 
continue the grant program, but it is too early to tell how 
much might be provided, if anything. 
The ultimate question, one beyond the scope of this 
paper to argue, is whether the program is worth contin-
uing. It is interesting to note that the National Study 
Commission has massive-sounding funding requir-
ements to meet the affordable goals of PL 92-500, if 
they are affordable. For instance, for industrial dis-
charges to meet the 1983 requirements, the annual rate 
of inflation for the price of the product of this industry 
will be 0.37%-of itself, an acceptable amount. 
Similarly, approximately $120 billion will be required in 
additional funds to meet the goals for municipal treat-
ment works. But when this is spread out over the eleven 
years which will realistically be needed, the financial 
requirements come to only 0.9% of the annual 
GMP-again, an affordable figure of itself. 
The answer to this ultimate question will of course be 
determined by many complex factors, including the state 
of the economy, shifting public priorities as natural 
resources dwindle, the continued social will to reallocate 
wealth, and the durability of the environmental ethic. 
But, at least the mechanisms have been set up and are 
working to assess, on a continuing basis, the rationale 
for, and progress of this massive undertaking. Whether 
or not the commitment to the goals of PL 92-500 will be 
continued will be a significant development, but it is 
already significant that PL 92-500, whatever it achieves 
in the area of water quality, is teaching us how to 
evaluate and utilize governmental programs in a much 
more sophisticated way. 
STARE 
DECISIS 
Jane Bedno 
A man must love his gentle mate, 
Support her, feed her, care for her; 1 
For God created female's state, 
Not to compete2, but to defer3 ; 
And, though now become a person4 , 
Benign rules still protect a lass5. 
Suspect not her special classification,S 
That courtly E.R.A.'s yet to pass
'
. 
Firm male justice rules the nation 
With wisdom, force, and verbiage8 ; 
The hand that rocked the cradle's passion 
Is due to a faulty hormonal gauge9 • 
1. MICHIE. JURISPRUDENCE, Husband and Wife, §21 at 
22; but note VA. CODE ANN. 20-61 (1975 Supp.) 
2. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1949). 
3. Bradwell v. State, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130, 132, 
141 (1872). 
4. United States ex rei. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 
8, 14 (1968). 
5. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) 
6. Frontiero v. Richardson, 441 U.S. 677 (1973) 
7. Brown, Ellinger, Falk, Freedman, The Equal Rights 
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights 
for Women, 80 Yale LJ. (1971) 
8. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420, 421, 422 
(1907). 
9. G. Murdock, Social Structure in Law: Its Nature, 
Functions and Umits (Howard and Summers, ed. 
1965). 
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Any student of the law will undoubtedly remember the 
1928 tort case Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 
301 (1928) where defendant, an amusement park em-
ployee, rented a canoe to a Mr. Hill, knowing that he was 
intoxicated and clearly incapable of safe navigation. Mr. 
Hill paddled out a bit and then inadvertently upset the 
boat. He clung to the overturned shell for half an hour. all 
the while uttering loud cries for help. There were boats 
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The Duty 
to 
Rescue 
available for a rescue attempt. Defendant. a peculiarly 
endearing type. smoked a cigarette on the dock as Hill 
drowned before him. In an apparently incomprehensible 
ruling. the court held that the defendant was under no 
legal duty to go to his aid. A 1966 case. Handiboe v. 
McCarthy. 114 Ca. App. 541. 151 S.E. 2d 905 (1966). 
similarly held that a servant was under no duty to rescue 
a small child drowning in his master's swimming pool. 
In my Torts class, there was a visible reaction of horror 
to these unsavory cases. Our moral sensibilities were 
deeply offended. Almost instinctively we turned to the 
legal system. "There ought to be a law", we cried. Nor 
were we alone. Such noted legal commentators as Dean 
Prosser and Dean Pound have joined in condemning this, 
to them, obvious moral obtuseness in the law. 
Prosser, considering as well the case of Yania v. Bigan, 
397 Pa. 316,155 A.2d 343 (1959), where the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court found no legal responsibility 
upon a defendant for challenging deceased to jump a 
wide, dangerous ditch, has commented that "it would be 
hard to find a more unappetizing trio of decisions. W. 
PROSSER,LAWOFToRTS 340 (4thed. 1971). He has argued 
that the results of these decisions derive from an "his-
torical reluctance to countenance non-feasance as a basis 
of liability." W. PROSSER, supra, at 340. Pound suggests 
that they represent an atavistic remnant of nineteenth 
century jurisprudence which manfully tried to separate 
legal principles from moral ones R. POUND, LAw AND 
MORALS 71-88 passim (2d ed. 1926). 
It is arguable, however, that the legal system's failure 
to impose an active duty of rescue is perhaps not so 
reprehensible as may first appear. In fact, it can be at 
least partially explained in terms of contemporary moral, 
legal and practical considerations. Obvious moral failings 
are not necessarily cured by a reflexive dumping of the 
problem into the legal system's collective lap. At times, 
there surely must be non-legal solutions to a problem 
which are preferable to legal alternatives. The question 
is: is this such a time or should there be a legal duty to 
rescue? 
Modern thinking would have no quarrel with Prosser 
if, in fact, old notions of non-feasance accounted for the 
absence of such a duty. The individual who is harmed 
because someone failed to act is no less injured than the 
individual who experienc'es an active assault. If the duty 
to rescue were rationalized away upon this basis, and this 
basis alone, it would represent a moral and legal ab-
dication of societal responsibility. A further analysis of 
the problem, however, shows that the absence of such a 
duty derives from more than this archaic distinction. 
Pound's blithe explanation does not do justice to the 
complexity of the problem. Modern courts do not always 
blindly defer to past legal traditions when there is an 
obvious and compelling reason to depart therefrom. 
No-if modern courts fail to recognize an active duty to 
rescue, there must be other considerations which also 
come into play. 
A starting point must be a consideration of the rela-
tionship between our moral and legal systems. Do we, 
even in theory, expect our legal system to encompass 
wholly our ethical system? Certainly we know that, in 
fact, one is not the mirror image of the other. Laws are 
not always the state's version of moral precepts although 
there are obvious and numerous overlaps. "Thou shalt 
not kill" appears in the legal code as a prohibition 
against killing with the added promise of state retribution 
should its law be violated. But the state, in regulating 
relationships between people, also must necessarily deal 
with situations devoid of moral content. Rules governing 
contractual relationships property relationships, alloca-
tion of risk, etc. have frequently developed withou! the 
aid of moral guidelines. So, too, there are moral rules 
which exist without the benefit of state sanction. Self-
lessness, the golden rule, the duty to honor one's parents 
have not found legal translation to date. 
For many of us, this lack of identity is welcomed, for 
one man's morality may well be another man's sin. Who 
is to decide which moral precepts shall have the force of 
law? Should those believing abortion to be immoral have 
access to state sanctioning power to impose their beliefs 
upon those who believe differently, or has the legal 
system wisely left some matters to the realm of moral 
persuasion alone? Contrary to Pound's insinuation that 
attempts to separate law and morals hark back to Nean-
derthalic times, POUND, supra, at 77}, many modern 
thinkers applaud this trend, at least with respect to laws 
regulating sexual mores. Many feel that consenting 
adults should be free to determine their own conduct and 
moral standards without state interference. This demon-
strates at the very least that there is some danger in 
assuming that the legal and moral systems should be 
ultimately coterminus. 
This conclusion does not necessarily resolve our prob-
lem as to a duty to rescue. That morality and the legal 
system sometimes cover areas unto themselves does not 
mean that a duty to rescue should not find expression in 
both. Is there any justification for this glaring omission? 
There is. It is the intervention of practical considerations 
which accounts for the law's apparent callousness. At its 
most fundamental level, the duty to rescue defies sound 
legislation. 
I 
-
. ... 
.. 
.. -
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It should be noted that those clamoring for the impo-
sition of such a duty are addressing themselves only to 
the situation where rescue would be danger-free for the 
rescuer. The law recognizes that it cannot command an 
individual to risk, gratuitously, his own life to save 
another. (It is interesting to note, however, that our moral 
system does ask this of us. Such acts are lauded as truly 
heroic, wholly selfless in fact the ultimate moral act; for 
what more can a society exact from an individual than his 
life?) While imposing a legal duty to rescue would not be 
difficult in the above-mentioned cases, the ramifications 
of such a duty would be perplexing in two regards: one-
how far does this duty extend; and two- what standards 
are we to establish to determine whether or not any 
danger is present? 
It is· impossible to delineate rationally the outer limits 
of this duty. Should each friend or casual acquaintance 
of the individual who smokes be held ultimately liable for 
his death from lung cancer? What about the alcoholic 
who sits next to you at work? We cannot dismiss these 
possibilities by saying that the individuals consciously 
choose to kill themselves and that the duty, therefore, 
does not extend to them. Few would ever suggest that 
we should say to the man about to leap from the ninth 
story, "Be my guest." 
In addition, is it reasonably possible to limit liability to 
an ascertainable group? What about the boulder in the 
middle of the road which hundreds of people pass by 
during the daytime which becomes a fatal obstacle that 
night? If we find one passerby, can we fairly hold him 
and only him responsible for the death that ensued? 
What standards should be used to determine whether 
the would-be rescuer was in danger? Should there be an 
objective standard (e.g., reasonable apprehension of 
faar) or a subjective one? Delineation of such a standard 
would seem to present enormous diffic\llties. Consider 
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the Genovese death several years ago where a large 
group of New Yorkers watched and listened to a young 
woman being murdered below their windows when help 
was only a phone call away. Afterwards, people said that 
they had not wished to get involved. Involvement for 
them probably meant becoming the next victim, an 
irrational fear perhaps, but a very real one to many living 
in urban America. In the Genovese case, should the 
actual on-lookers alone have been condemned? Should 
not the city have borne part of the responsibility? If New 
Yorkers had felt that they would have been protected, 
perhaps they would have been less reluctant to become 
"involved. " 
If we assume that the duty to rescue presents serious 
legislative obstacles, can we content ourselves in its 
absence, or should we risk the unknown and attempt to 
legislate anyway? Let us return to our defendant who so 
calmly smoked his cigarette while another human being 
begged for help to save his life. Let us keep in mind that 
the same moral sensitivity which is so shocked by 
defendant's inaction also recoils from the idea of pun-
ishment of "criminals" because it does little to resolve 
the problem of crime. What kind of man is our defendant 
canoe keeper? Certainly not someone we would care to 
dine with. Can we suppose that a legal sanction would 
motivate this obviously callous, if not sick, individual to 
act? (We no longer believe that laws forbidding murder in 
fact prevent murders.) Perhaps legislation would make 
us feel better, e.g. "if one amongst us be that indifferent, 
know ye that he shall pay"? But what would a law 
against indifference accomplish? Aren't we, in fact, 
saying, how could anyone, with no danger to himself, not 
rescue another? But this is just the point. Those who 
would not rescue under such circumstances are, more 
likely than not, sick, highly anti-social individuals who 
are in need of mental help rather than legal directives. 
Should we draft a law which would essentially address 
itself to this small. rather unusual class of people. and 
which well may not have any affect on it at all? 
Clearly. priorities must be considered. One author 
compares the law to a vigilant sheep dog. He points out: 
many middle-class Americans feel secure enough from 
personal aggression that they forget the wolves around 
them and demand that their sheep dog act more like a 
solicitous veterinarian. Perhaps he should: nevertheless. 
statistics and case histories of violent crime indicate that 
our society still needs canina teeth in guard to protect 
it-not against the psssive indifference of the pssser-by 
but against the active assault of tha robbers. rapists and 
murderars.·· EDMOND CAHN. THE MORAL DECISION (1955). 
If we assume that criminal laws do affect behaviour •. and 
that the imposition of a duty to rescue would save lives. 
then perhaps the question is one of selectivity. Obvious-
ly. any legal code cannot cover all instances of injury to 
another. Are the circumstances here such as to warrant a 
law or are there other acts. more destructive of the social 
fabric. which occur more frequently and there-
by demand priority treatment? In the last analysis. one 
might conclude that the situations where there is no 
danger-real or imagined-are infrequent and therefore 
not totally deserving of legal sanction. On the other 
hand. one life saved is probably reason enough for a law. 
Casting aside practical considerations, one must finally 
ask philosophically what such legislation would do to us 
as moral beings. Mr. Cahn provides a valuable insight as 
he discusses an episode from Fielding's Joseph Andrews 
(CAHN. supra, at 187-91). Joseph had been set upon by 
thieves and stripped of all possessions, including his 
clothes. A stagecoach passed by and, at first. none of the 
passengers expressed the slightest inclination to help. 
Afterward., people 
said that thev 
had not wanted 
to get inllo/lled. 
The coachmen wanted a fare. the woman passenger was 
offended by his nakedness, and an elderly passenger was 
afraid of being robbed. "However. it happened that one 
of the unsympathetic passengers was a young lawyer, a 
very cautious lawyer at that. He warned the others that if 
Joseph should die. they might be proved to have been 
the last in his company and might be called to account 
for his death." (Supra. at 188). Fear of prosecution 
rather than any moral impulse finally convinced the 
passengers to take Joseph in. 
As Cahn points out, the passengers' initial decision not 
to let Joseph in was unenlightened selfishness while their 
ultimate decision to let him ride with them was merely 
enlightened selfishness. Any attempt to impose a legal 
sanction may curb behaviour such as with the Fielding 
story but it will not elevate man's morality. It will provide 
one more instance of doing something because it is 
required by law rather than by an individual's moral 
dictates. In a sense, it robs the individual of his moral 
satisfaction-it takes the fun out of being moral. On the 
other hand. it would surely be ridiculous to sacrifice lives 
for the sake of any moral gratification. The question is 
really, would such a law save lives? Would Mr. Canoe 
Keeper have behaved any differently if there had been a 
law on the books? 
On further reflection. the question of imposing a legal 
duty to rescue is more difficult than it would first appear. 
The absence of the legal duty does not automatically 
make the common law immoral or amoral. Rather. it 
could show that the law is. above all else. practical and it 
would prefer to remain silent rather than to speak badly. 
Perhaps the law has deferred to other social mechanisms 
recognizing that law alone cannot solve all human prob-
lems or achieve all desired social objectiVes. Can we 
really say that in making this choice. the law was unwise? 
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POSITIVE EUGENICS 
AND THE LAW 
The term "eugenics" was coined by Sir Francis Galton 
in 1883 to denote the study and manipulation of factors 
that improve hereditary qualities. The goal of negative 
eugenics is the diminution· of inferior genetic qualities. 
Positive eugenics, on the other, hand, entails the 
propagation of superior genes. 
Initially, interest in eugenics centered on the negative 
aspect of the science, that is the reduction of totally 
dependent individuals who are born into the world only 
to suffer and be cared for by society. The n'gative 
eugenics movement reached its zenith in the early 
twentieth century when organizations like the Interna-
tional Eugenics Congress were formed to combat genetic 
degeneration. The Congress favored premarital syphilis 
tests, incest prohibi1ions, antimiscegenation laws and 
sterilization statutes. To a large degree the Congress 
succeeded in achieving its goals. The Wasserman test 
was instituted, incest and antimiscegenation laws were 
enacted, and statutes providing for the sterilization of 
mental defectives and criminals became commonplace. 
The Congress, however, was a casualty of the Second 
World War. The horrible experience of the Nazi Rassen-
hygiene resulted in a distaste for genetic experimentation 
shared by scientist and layman alike. 
The realities of our modern age have rekindled interest 
in genetic engineering. Genes are chemical substances 
that are not completely stable. Mutations may occur from 
chemical imbalances or radiation during the reproductive 
process. Radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, medical 
X-rays and chemicel additives in food are largely re-
sponsible for the increased "genetic load" and, hence, 
the increased rete of mutation. Today about one child in 
twenty is born with a discernible genetic defect. 1 Still 
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others die before birth because of the disruptive impact 
mutations have on genetic coordination. 
Recognition of the implications of the genetic load 
problem has prompted research in the area of positive 
eugenics. The most recent developments in this field are 
collectively known as cloning. The term "cloning," 
which means "cutting," is a botanical term that refers to 
a type of asexual reproduction that is characterized by 
the creation of individuals that are derived from a single 
parent and genetically identical to that parent. The 
cloning process may be divided into two stages. Enu-
cleation involves the removal of the nucleus from a 
female egg (a sex cell is "haploid," containing only one 
set of chromosomes). The second stage, known as ra-
nucleation calls for replacement of the egg nucleus by the 
nucleus from an adult body cell (a "diploid cell," having 
both sets of chromosomes) of the prospective parent. 
Cloning experimentation on plant and lower forms of 
animal life has been successful in reproducing gene-
tically identical progeny. 
THE CASE FOR BANNING HUMAN 
GENETIC EXPERIMENTATION 
As of the time of this writing, a considerable furor has 
arisen in the academic community over the question of 
whether to commence human cloning experimentation. 
Prominent men of science: Dr. Leon Kass, the executive 
secretary of the Committee for the Life Sciences and 
Social Policy of the National Academy of Sciences, Dr. 
James D. Watson, the Nobel laureate molecular 
biologist, and prominent theologian Professor Paul 
Ramsey have urged a total prohibition of human cloning. 
In support of this proposal, they have raised several 
serious scientific objections. One objection is that the 
identification of genetically superior persons to be the 
subjects of a positive eugenics program is exceedingly 
difficult. A person with superior genes may exhibit 
qualities associated with inferior genetic stock because of 
poor diet, limited education, or lack of adequate medical 
care. Furthermore, at present, scientists suffer from vast 
gaps of knowledge with respect to the effects of genetic 
manipulation.2 Traits useless to one generation may be 
essential to a succeeding generation. The fate of the 
human race would be determined by myopic scientific 
controls. Similarly, scientists are uncertain as to the 
interactions of genes. Most traits are polygenic.3 Thus, 
the desirable genotype chosen for replication might carry 
with it undesirable side traits. 
Perhaps the most serious indictment of such a pro-
gram is that clonal decisions would not rest on valid 
scientific grounds independent of the social and philo-
sophical biases of the controllers. A classic example of 
the interjection of philosophical bias in the gene selection 
process is the disparity between the 1935 and 1959 lists 
of ideal genotypes compiled by Professor H. J. Muller, a 
prominent geneticist. In 1935 Professor Muller was an 
avowed Marxist. Not surprisingly, Marx and Lenin were 
listed as desirable genotypes to be propagated. By 1959 
his political views had mellowed. This change was 
reflected in his revised list, which omitted Marx and 
Lenin and included Lincoln and Descartes.4 
The danger of changing societal values affecting clonal 
decisions is as much an ethical consideration as scien-
tific. In the absence of a detailed proposal for an institu-
tionalized framework, it is difficult to discuss the question 
of democratic control and safeguards against abuse. 
Certainly the benevolence of Professor Muller is no 
guarantee against abuse by a state subject to changing 
ideals and tastes. 
Cloning would have a devastating impact on the 
Anglo-American concept of individuality. The sanctity of 
individuality finds expression in the Declaration of 
Independence: 
In democratic societies there is a fundamental belief in 
the uniqueness of the individual, his basic dignity and 
worth as 8 human being, and in the need to maintain 
social processas that safeguard his sacred individuality." 
Genetic fabrication is a form of determinism. Societal 
pressures would likely deprive the clonant of personal 
autonomy by channeling all his energies in a predeter-
mined course. For example, a young Einstein cion ant 
would be "encouraged" to study mathematics and 
physics. This denial of free will to the clonant might also 
lead to widespread self-degradation. Cloning technology 
is capable of destroying the intuitive sense of in-
dividuality. Consequently, a clonant would tend to per-
ceive himself less a human being than a manufactured 
product. In short, cloning might cause a substantial 
erosion of human dignity. 
While the quintessential scientific question is "Can 
man play God1", the paramount ethical concern is 
"Should man play God?" The question is easier to 
answer in the affirmative when we envision a genetic 
engineering program improving human intellectual skills 
and generally enhancing the quality of life. It stands to 
reason, however, that everyone cannot be Einstein or a 
Beethoven. Nor would the controllers opt for such a 
society, for the delegation of the menial but necessary 
tasks of society to gifted clonants would arouse their 
rebellious instincts. It follows that the controllers would 
have to clone a certain percentage of mediocre or inferior 
human beings as well as geniuses. Whether one man 
should so preordain another's fate is a question of deep 
religious and ethical significance. 
"Thus. the desirable genotype chosen 
might carry with it undesirable side 
traits." 
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II It must be concluded that these 
justifications are not suffident 
to deprive the individual of 
dvilliberties, " 
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS 
Let us suppose Congress enacted legislation creating a 
compulsory positive eugenics program. The constitu-
tionality of such legislation could be challenged on 
several possible grounds. 
The right of privacy is implicitly recognized in the First, 
Fourth, Fifth. and Ninth Amendments. Specifically. the 
right to control one's reproductive functions has been 
held to fall within the "penumbra" of the First Amend-
ment guarantees.' In Skinnerv. Oklahomas the Supreme 
Court struck down a statute providing for sterilization of 
habitual criminals on the ground that the statute violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court stated: 
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one 
of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation 
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race. The power to steriliza. if exercised. may hava subtla 
far-reaching and devastating effect.. I n evil Dr reckless 
hands it can cause races Dr types which a, inimical to the 
dominant group to wither and disappear. 
In Griswold v Connecticut8 the Court asserted that the 
fundamental right of marital privacy was within the 
"penumbra" of the First Amendment. Eisenstadt v. 
Bairr/ extended this penumbra to envelope sexual inter-
course in general. The right of privacy in heterosexual 
matters. however. is not absolute. As noted by the Court 
in Roe v. Wade 'O a statute impinging upon the re-
productive capacity will be upheld if it is representative 
of a "compelling state interest. ,,11 In addition. the statue 
must be nar~owly drawn to achieve the state's purpose; 
that is. there should not be a less onerous alternative for 
implementing the legislative goal. 12 
Clearly a statute regulating the fundamental right of 
procreation would be violative of the First Amendment 
unless a compelling justification for the imposition of 
genetic controls were shown. One author has suggested 
that the reduction of human suffering would qualify as a 
state interest sufficient to justify a deprivation of fun-
damental rights. 13 Not all would find this interest "com-
palling." Initially it would be necessary to try to balance 
the suffering caused by the deprivation of the right to 
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have children against the possible suffering of a child 
who may be born with a genetic disease. Then it would 
be necessary to address the question of whether life for a 
child with a genetic disease or defect is preferable to no 
life at all. In the case of sickle-cell anemia. for example, 
the state interest in preventing procreation by afflicted 
parents is particularly weak since the child has only a 
twenty five per cent chance of inheriting the disease. 
A second possibility might be the recognition of a 
governmental economic interest in preventing the birth 
of children with genetic diseases and defects; but it 
cannot be said with any certainty that the government 
will bear the costs of their care. A direct economic 
interest of the government would exist only insofar as the 
prospective parents might be impoverished; but a statute 
denying a couple the right to procreate solely because of 
indigency would violate the Equal Protection Clause. 14 
Still another proposed justification is that a statute 
instituting a compulsory positive eugenics program 
would safeguard public health and welfare. However. as 
mentioned previously. no adequate scientific basis for 
the imposition of genetic controls has yet been demon-
strated. We simply have not guaranteed that the in-
cidence of inferior genes would be reduced without 
deleterious side effects. Also, absent adequate scientific 
bases for the controls. the program would inevitably be 
administered on the basis of half baked medical notions 
and socio-political theories. It must be concluded that 
these justifications also are not sufficiently compelling to 
'deprive the individual of fundamental civil liberties. 
Arguably. positive eugenics statutes would violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
appears clear that when the state dictates what kind of 
people will be produced it has created classes of people 
who are not equal. Such a statutory discrimination will 
be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause only where 
rationally founded. '5 The denial of a particular class of 
the right to reproduce because "their kind" are not 
needed at the time might well be considered patently 
unreasonable. 
A statute creating a compulsory positive eugenics 
program would likely contravene the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. The Thirteenth Amendment has been described by 
one commentator as the "constitutional repository of our 
notions of free will and personal autonomy . . . ,,16 
Genetic determinism would be incompatible with our 
conception of free will and would impair the individual's 
internal autonomy, thereby deleteriously affecting exter-
nal autonomy-that is, the exercise of one's civil liber-
ties. The designation of genotypic inferiority would 
create a "badge of slavery;" the denial of eugenic 
technology to a designated class would constitute an 
unconstitutional form of oppression. This expansive view 
of the Thirteenth Amendment beyond dejure en-
slavement is consistent with a recent interpretation of the 
amendment in Jones v. Alfred Mayer CO.,17 where the 
Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting 
housing discrimination on the ground that such dis-
crimination in our modern society was a "badge or 
incident of slavery. " 
A state program for positive eugenics is unlikely to 
comport with the anti-aristocratic and anti-elitest values 
of the Nobility Clause of the Constitution.'s The Nobility 
Clause evinces the American aversion to a class receiving 
special privileges. By virtue of its designation of a 
genetically superior group, positive eugenics arguably 
has a constitutionally impermissible purpose under the 
Nobility Clause. 
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORTS 
The right of privacy, guarantee of equal protection 
under the law, and prohibitions against enslavement and 
a privileged class afford a formidable constitutional 
argument for banning in toto human genetic engineer-
ing. However, a meritorious constitutional argument 
against a total prohibition of positive eugenics can be 
made. 
The Griswold-Eisenstadt- Wade trilogy is not neces-
sarily applicable to the case of positive eugenics. Gris-
wold may be distinguished in that a positive eugenics 
program (cloining or in vitro fertilization, for example) 
may not involve marital rights but rather the rights of one 
parent. Similarly, while Eisenstadt protects the right to 
have sex without children, it does not consider the 
question of children without sex. Wade merely stands for 
the proposition that a woman has a right to have auton-
omy over her body. Wade is clearly inapposite to in vitro 
births. Furthermore, the right of privacy arguably is 
counterbalanced by our time-honored tradition of 
academic freedom. In Griswold Justice Douglas argued 
that the First Amendment is sufficiently broad to protect 
"freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom 
to teach ... indeed, the freedom of the entire university 
community. ,,19 A total prohibition of eugenics exper-
imentation would violate this fundamental freedom of 
academic inquiry. 
Moreover, the denial of equal protection argument is 
specious. Admittedly, legislation which denied benefits 
and imposed burdens on the basis of race was irrational 
because race is unrelated to a person's ability to perform, 
his contributions to society or any other quality which 
would justify the discrimination. Eugenics legislation, 
however, would be rational to the extent that fun-
damental rights of persons would be abridged only to 
prevent their passing deleterious genes to future gener-
ations. A eugenics statute designed to filter out undesir-
able genes would, on its face, no more constitute a denial 
of equal protection than would the denial of a driver's 
license by reason of the operator's physical deformities. 
The Supreme Court has upheld negative eugenics 
legislation on the ground that the stete interest in con-
trolling genetic diseases justifies the statutory discimin-
ation. In Buck v. Belfo the Court upheld a Virginia statute 
providing for the sterilization, in state supported institu-
tions, of inmates who were adjudged to have had a 
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hereditary form of insanity or imbecility, The petitioner 
was a feebleminded woman in a state institution, 
daughter of another feebleminded inmate and the 
mother of an illegitimate feebleminded child. Speaking 
for the majority, Justice Holmes declared: 
It is belter for all the world. if instead of waiting to 
execute degenerate offspring for crime. or to let them 
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who 
are manifestly unfit from continuing ~~eir kind ... Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough. 
The Buck rationale that the state may exercise its police 
power to promote public health and welfare may be 
applicable in the case of a positive eugenics statute. 
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EUGENICS CONTROL LEGISLATION 
Several authorities have suggested that a positive 
eugenics program should be made available to the public 
on a voluntary basis. 22 Surely a voluntary program would 
obviate both the constitutional barrier of the fundamental 
right to procreate and opposition from those in the 
religious community who believe that procreation is the 
highest form of love. A financial incentive in the form of 
greater tax deductions for participants has been urged, 
but while greater tax deductions might induce the rich to 
participate in the program, they would fail in being any 
incentive for the poor. In the final analysis. most Amer-
icans are probably not prepared to voluntarily change their 
attitudes toward reproduction. "It is doubtful that a 
discriminatory program would be voluntarily accepted by 
those against whom it discriminated. ,,23 In short. a 
voluntary program would be inconsistent. uneven and 
largely ineffectual in operation, 
A desirable alternative to either a complete ban on 
human genetic experimentation or a voluntary eugenics 
program is limited governmental control of eugenics 
research. Governmental intervention into the area of 
scientific research and experimentation could be justified 
on the ground that misdirected applications of positive 
eugenics would constitute a serious and imminent 
danger to the public health and morals. Such an interest. 
if adequately shown. has long been recognized by the 
tourts as sufficiently compelling to permit social 
controlS,2. Thus, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts 2S the 
Supreme Court held that a compulsory vaccination law 
was a reasonable regulation established to protect public 
health and safety and, therefore. not in derogation of due 
process rights. 
One commentator has concluded that "the law must 
react before it is placed in the position of having to 
accept genetic engineering rather than to choose. ,,26 The 
problem. however, is not simply resolved by passing 
legislation providing for controls on scientific research. A 
compelling state interest for legislating social control 
must be shown. A mere possibility of genetic disaster. a 
danger not "imminent," may not be a sufficient jus-
tification for research controls. Sadly enough. it might be 
only after a genetic mishap that a state interest would 
become sufficiently compelling for control legislation to 
withstand the scrutiny of the courts. 
In the interim, funding policies may indeed channel 
eugenics research and development. The percentage of 
research funds from private origins has steadily declined 
in the past decade. It has been estimated that. since 
1966. 59 per cent of all medical research grants were 
federal in origin. 27 The allocation of these massive funds 
is an effective method of curtailin9 "undesirable" re-
search. The drawback of this method. however, is the 
lack of any official accountability for manifest abuses of 
discretion. 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
With some reservations it is submitted that the only 
effective solution to the problem of anticipating and 
channeling developments in genetic engineering is the 
creation of a federal eugenics control board.2a The board 
would be interdisciplinary in character. comprised of 
scientists. lawyers. theologians. philosophers. social 
scientists and laymen. Terms of office would be so 
staggered as to prevent manipulation of the board by an 
incumbent political faction. Its function would be to 
consider and determine standards for the denial of 
procreation and for genetic experimentation. Specific 
rulings would be reviewable by federal district courts. 
An administrative agency has the inherent advantages 
of expertise and permanence. Rigid statutory mandates 
are inadequate in dealing with the rapidly expanding 
field of genetics. Ultimately. the effectiveness of such a 
board depends on whether the scientific community is 
willing to cooperate in the venture. If scientists perceive 
the board as a cumbersome bureaucracy stifling 
academic inquiry. or if in fact it is. the possibility of 
controlling positive eugenics research and experimenta-
tion will be greatly diminished. 
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One commentator has remarked. "Unrestricted scien-
tific research must be allowed. for if law or the threat of 
law immobilizes science. the future of mankind is not 
promising but dismal. .. 21 Nonetheless. it is a maxium of 
human history that first man creates and then he 
regulates. No field of human endeavor is free from fegal 
constraints. Moreover. while the thought of regulation of 
scientific research is abhorrent. the implications of gen-
etic engineering-the denial of free will. of an intuitive 
sense of individuality and of the right to procreate. 
self-degradation. a compassionless society-requires 
legal controls on genetic experimentation. As Chief 
Justice Burger has stated: 
Science unrestrained would be somewhat like an ab-
solute monarch-a great aarvant. but a terrible master. 
Law is inherently restraint; it is a restraint on kings. 
congre.ses and presidents . . . Those who become 
impetient with the slow pece of the law's responaa to the 
need. of science must remember that the history of 
Westem philosophy shows that we cherish many values 
above scientifIC 3Sdvances: sciencs must function within 
thIS framework. 
This author supports the latter perspective. 
19. 381 U.S. 479. 482 (1965). See ./so Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
20. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
21. 274 U.S. at 207. 
22. Sea, e.g .• Waltz 8t Thigpjn. Genetic Screening and Qwnseling: 
The Legll/andEthiclIl/ssues. 6B N.w. L. REV. 696. 7t2 (1973). 
The United States and Commonwealth of Virginia have adopted 
voluntary sickle cell anemia screening and counseling programs. 
National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act. 88 Stat. 136 (codified in 
various sections of 42, 33 U.S.C. Supp. II 1972); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 32-112.20 to 112.23 (Supp. 1973). But see Golding. 
Ethical Issues in Biologiclll Engineering, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 443. 
471 (1968). 
23. See Vukowich. SUP'II. note 4. at 206. 
24. See Buck v. Bell. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
25. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
26. Note. AsexulIl Reproduction and G_tic Engineering: A Constitu-
tional Assessment of the Technology of Cloning. 47 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 476. 636 (1974). 
27 Id. at 626. 
28. Congress could pess legislation creating 8 eugenics control board 
by vitrure of it. commerce powers. Gibbons Y. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1 (1924). and research would only have to meet the 
"close and substantial relationship" to interstate commerce test. 
NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp .• 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
29. Comment. The Legal Implications of Ectogenetic Resun:h. 10 
TULSA L. J. 243 (1974). 
30. Burger. Raflections on Law and Experiment.' Medicine. 15 
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 436. 441 (1968). Chief Justice 8urger has also 
stressed: "Obviously there ar. certain genetic drawbacks to 
letting people reproduce themaalves indiscriminately. but abaant 
some specific disqualification where medicine can predict certain 
tragic consequences of 8 union between certain genetic types. 
ordinary mortals will continue to mate on an emotional rather than 
8 scientific plane." 
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The Morality 
of Suicide 
R. Gregory Barton 
A pilot alone in a large plane experiences a complete 
engine malfunction over a heavily populated area. In-
stead of bailing out to safety and possibly allowing the 
plane to kill many people, he remains in the plane and 
steers it into neighboring mountains, killing himself.' A 
man with a large family discovers that he has a long-term 
illness that will require exorbitant medical care. Lacking 
medical insurance, or appropriate life insurance, the man 
kills himself rather than subjecting his family to possible 
financial ruin. 
In time of war, a secret agent is captured by the 
enemy. Fully aware that torture and truth serums will 
cause him to reveal information extremely damaging to 
the cause he believes in, he kills himself. In primitive 
tribes, old men voluntarily leave the tribe and starve or 
freeze to death in times of famine so that younger 
members of the tribe can survive. 
Suicide is regarded by contemporary Western man 
with instinctive horror and dread, primarily because it 
intransigently rejects our deeply-held impulses of self-
preservation. We conceive of suicide in tragic terms, the 
victim being one who must have acted in a moment of 
deep despair and great irrationality if not insanity. The 
suicide troubles and appalls us because his action 
squarely contradicts our conviction that life must be 
worth living. For these reasons suicide is presently 
viewed as a serious social problem and contemporary 
concern with suicide primarily focuses on its prevalence 
and prevention. 
However, . suicide may also be viewed in a moral 
context: For centuries man has debated over whether or 
not the intentional killing of oneself may be morally 
justified. This debate has been recently intensified by the 
rapid development of modern medicine Which, in greatly 
prolonging the duration of human life, has perhaps made 
the idea of suicide more attractive to those facing years of 
grave illness or debilitating old age. Let us attempt to 
examine suicide from an historic and philosophic per-
spective to analyze the legal and moral issues raised by 
the concept of self-destruction. 
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Societal responses to the act of self-destruction in the 
past have ranged from outright condemnation as ab-
solute sin on the one hand, to acceptance and incorpor-
ation into the social and moral code on the other. As a 
form of human behavior, suicide apparently is as old as 
man himself. Anthropological studies have established 
that suicide has been practiced for thousands of years in 
primitive and historic societies. 
During the time of the ancient Greeks and Romans, 
suicide, although never actually encouraged, neverthe-
less was often considered socially acceptable. Honor 
suicides to avoid capture and humiliation by the enemy 
were apparently frequent and approved of by contem-
poraries. On the Greek island of Keos, persons over sixty 
years of age were expected to poison themselves with 
hemlock when it was obvious that they were no longer 
socially useful or productive. Furthermore, certain 
schools of philosophers such as the Epicureans and the 
Roman Stoics advocated suicide as a reasonable exercise 
of human freedom. 
Suicide was not originally condemned by the estab-
lishment of the new religion, Christianity. In fact, suicide 
may have been fairly common among early Christians 
since it appeared to provide a quick route to the afterlife 
of eternal bliss. The eventual Christian doctrine on 
suicide was originally formulated by St. Augustine 
(354-430) in The City of God. Augustine condemned 
suicide on three grounds: that it violated the command-
ment "Thou shalt not kill" , that it precluded any oppor-
tunity for repentance, and that it was a cowardly act. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) enlarged upon Augus-
tine's views by condeming suicide because it was det-
rimental to the community and because it usurped God's 
prerogative to determine man's fate. This Augustine-
Aquinas pOSition on suicide remains to this day that of 
Christianity. Intentional self-destruction is a sin because 
it is a violation of the fifth commandment, a usurpation of 
God's prerogative, and a social wrong. 
With the gradual emergence of the Renaissance there 
developed challenges to the orthodox Christian views on 
the sinfulness of suicide. In 1516, Sir Thomas Moore in 
Utopia recommended suicide for those suffering from 
incurable and painful diseases. In the early seventeenth 
century, John Donne published Biathanatos, a com-
"For centuries man has debated 
over whether or not the 
intentional killing of oneself 
may be morally justified" 
prehensive defense of suicide designed to prove that 
self-destruction was not incompatible with the laws of 
reason or of God. In the eighteenth century. Voltaire. 
Montesquieu and Hume all at some time in their careers 
defended the act of suicide. In the nineteenth century. 
Schopenhauer vigorously advocated suicide since life 
was similar to an unpleasant dream. the sooner ended 
the better. As a gross generalization. one may state that a 
number of contemporary writers have relegated suicide 
to a question of personal choice that requires no moral 
justification. 
In certain non-Western societies. suicide has not 
traditionally been regarded as a moral wrong or sin. For 
example. in Japan and India. voluntary self-destruction 
(hari-kari or settee in the respective countries) was once 
viewed as a somewhat honorable act. often available to 
the nobility as a means to remove the stigma for past 
misdeeds. In certain Eskimo civilizations. aged members 
were expected to voluntarily leave camp and freeze to 
death so that others could exist within available food 
supplies. 
Thus. even a cursory examination of suicide as prac-
ticed in the past reveals that by no means have all people 
considered suicide as an absolute moral wrong. In con-
trast to the Christian condemnation of suicide. some 
societies have accepted and even approved of the act of 
intentional self-destruction. 
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE3 
In accordance with religious condemantion of suicide. 
the English common law subjected the person who of 
sound mind took his own life to severe post-mortem 
penalties. First. the suicide was declared to be guilty of a 
felony. Next. the suicide was subject to civil penalties 
which included forfeiture of land. and goods to the 
Crown. Finally. as Blackstone reports in his Commentar-
ies (Oxford: IV. 190). the suicide was buried not in the 
churchyard. but in the highway with a stake driven 
through the body. The last practice was a pagan tradition 
to keep the ghost from returning to earth. Blackstone's 
presentation of the reasons behind the common law 
condemnation of suicide is instructive as to the impor-
tance of religious considerations. 
And also the law of England wisely and religiously 
considers that no man hath a power to destroy life. but by 
commission from God. the author of it; and as the suicide 
is guilty of double offence. one spiritual. in invading the 
prerogative of the Almighty. and rushing into his im· 
mediate presence uncalled for; the other temporal. 
against the King. who hath an interest in the preservation 
of all his subjectS. the law has therefore ranked it among 
the highest crimes. making it 8 peculiar species commit· 
ted on one's self. (Commentaries: IV. 189). 
Since suicide was a felony at common law, an attempt 
to commit suicide was a misdemeanor. Also. one who 
encouraged and assisted another to commit suicide was 
guilty of a felony. as a principal if he was present at the 
act which caused death. and as an accessory before the 
fact if he was not present when the suicide was com-
mitted. Thus, at common law, if two entered into a 
suicide pact and only one was successful. the other 
would be gUilty of murder. 
Present English law still classifies suicide as a felony 
although no forfeiture of goods nor ignomious burial are 
involved. The major legal effect is the avoidance of life 
insurance policies on the principle that a man may not 
profit by his own criminal act. Attempted suicide is still 
viewed as a common law misdemeanor and aiding and 
abetting suicide will result in severe criminal penalties. 
Unlike other areas of the common law. the English 
rules on suicide were not generally adopted in the United 
States. fn 1660. Massachusetts pessed a statute pro-
scribing a Christian burial for suicides and decreeing thet 
they should be buried in the highway with a cartload of 
stones on the grave as a mark of infamy. However. the 
statute was not adopted in other states and was even-
tually repealed, 
The present law on suicide in the United States has 
many points of conflict and confusion. In the majority of 
the states. suicide is not a crime. while a small minority 
of states such as New Jersey still classify suicide as a 
felony. In the case of attempted suicide. the majority rule 
is that it is not criminal. although a minority classify it as 
a misdemeanor. Since a majority of states do not make 
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suicide criminal, then theoretically aiding and abetting it 
should not be either; but the majority of states have 
avoided this logical conclusion by making the assistance 
of a suicide a separate criminal offense. In fact, in some 
states, aiding, abetting or inciting a suicide may be 
murder in the first degree. 
In evaluating Anglo-American law on suicide, one is 
impressed most of all with the basic irrelevance of the 
criminal law to the subject. It is obvious that making 
suicide a criminal offense serves no social purpose 
whatsoever, since a man soon deceased could not pos-
sibly be deterred by the threat of penal measures. In the 
case of attempted suicide, having the law promise to 
punish the potential suicide if he should fail in his 
attempt may only serve the purpose of insuring that the 
person genuinely intending to end his own life will do a 
good job of it. Thus, it appears absurd to talk in terms of 
deterrence in relation to suicide or attempted suicide 
since it is inconceivable that a potential suicide or 
attempted suicide would seriously consider the pos-
sibilities of criminal punishment. 
The only other possible argument for the retention of 
the crime of .attempted suicide is that it may enable 
medical treatment to be given to the attempter. However, 
there are obviously ways of insuring that needy people 
receive medical attention other than first making them 
criminals. Furthermore, although this paper will not 
discuss the causes of suicide, recent studies have refuted 
past contentions that all suicides are insane and have 
found, that in fact, only a very small percentage of 
suicides are caused by insanity. 
Moreover, a substantial number of suicides may be 
called "rational suicides" since the competent individual 
involved carefully weighs the attractiveness of life and 
death and opts for the latter. In such situations, medical 
treatment would not appear to be extremely helpful. 
Thus, the criminal law is basically irrelevant in regard 
to the potential suicide, since criminalizing the acts of 
suicide or attempted suicide serves no real social pur-
pose. However, in regard to the criminalizing of the acts 
of aiding, abetting or. inciting a suicide, the law may be 
relevant. The individual assisting a suicide, if he is not 
also attempting to commit suicide as part of a suicide 
pact, obviously plans to survive the suicide and hence 
deterrence may be a factor. Assuming there is a social 
interest in the life of the individual. the legal system is 
justified in making assistance of a suicide a crime since it 
may prevent 11 suicide that would otherwise be commit-
ted. However, outside this limited area of assistance of a 
suicide, the law appears to be basically irrelevant to the 
concept of self-destruction. 
MORAL PERSPECTIVE 
In examining suicide from a moral perspective, it 
appears impossible to generalize categorically on the 
morality of the act of intentional self-destruction. While 
in the past certain theologians and philosophers such as 
St. Augustine and Immanuel Kant have posited that 
suicide in all circumstances is morally wrong, it would 
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appear that, upon careful consideration, such an ab-
solute position would today have to be qualified by even 
the most adamant moral critic of suicide. 
In each of the deaths described at the beginning of this 
article, there are acts of suicide or intentional self-des-
truction. However, it would appear that few of us would 
characterize all these actions as morally wrong. In fact, 
regardless of the wisdom of the specific acts involved, 
most of us would probably characterize at least several of 
them as heroic self-sacrifices to save others. Thus, it is 
impossible to stereotype all suicides categorically as 
immoral actions. 
Acknowledging that suicide may not .always be morally 
wrong, may one state that it is morally wrong for an 
individual to take his own life for reasons of his own 
personal welfare? Putting aside religious considerations, 
the morality of an act would seem to be determined by its 
social consequences. Suppose an individual without 
acquaintances or family drowns himself in the middle of 
the ocean. The action is so far removed from society that 
there is no problem of a social nusiance, and actually no 
one else is affected at all since no one knew of either the 
man or his suicide. One may argue that society has lost a 
protentially useful citizen and in fact this appears to have 
been Blackstone's "temporal" reason for denouncing 
suicide. However, in these days of overpopulation such a 
contention would appear frivolous. The action may 
realistically be viewed as void of significant social con-
sequences and for this reason a morally neutral action. In 
other words, since the individual's action has neither hurt 
nor harmed anyone else, his suicide would not neces-
sarily appear to be morally wrong. 
Perhaps the best generalization that can be made 
concerning the morality of suicide is that intentional 
self-destruction is not justified when made for personal 
reasons and where the act adversely affects third per-
sons. For example, suppose a supporter of a large family 
decides that because of the tensions and frustrations of 
modern society he will kill himself. However, by killing 
himself he voids his life insurance policies and leaves his 
dependents totally without financial support. Moreover, 
he leaves his friends and family with deep and perman-
ent feelings of sorrow, pain, guilt and even embarrass-
ment. Here the suicide may be viewed as a selfish and 
immoral act. For the purpose of permanently relieving his 
anxieties, the individual has directly caused others ser-
ious financial and emotional problems. Thus, the ar-
gument that suicide is morally wrong when it is com-
mitted for personal reasons and when it adversely affects 
other people may have some logic to it. Still, even this 
generalization may fall in certain circumstances, and an 
appropriate area in which to examine this proposition is 
that of euthanatic suicide. 
"Euthanatic suicide", or "active euthanasia" stands 
for the intentional self-destruction of individuals suffering 
from an incurable disease or facing impending death 
who choose suicide rather than endure extended suffer-
ing. Euthanatic suicide is really suicide to escape a 
miserable life. 
The moral problems raised by euthanatic suicide are 
easily resolved if everyone involved agrees that the 
individual should be encouraged to take his own life. For 
example. if the family and friends of the gravely-ill 
individual decide that he should be allowed to commit 
suicide rather than face extended and unnecessary 
agony. it would be difficult to characterize the suicide as 
a moral wrong. However. difficulties will arise if the 
euthanatic suicide will adversely affect third persons. and 
merely by characterizing the death as suicide may trouble 
and embarrass next of kin and close acquaintances. 
In such situations. it appears that the moral problem 
can only be resolved by a difficult balancing process. On 
the one hand. it is true that an euthanatic suicide may 
have moral consequences in that third parties can be 
adversely affected. On the other hand. a euthanatic 
suicide may save the individual from an extremely pain" 
ful and miserable death. In some circumstances. the 
individual may feel that it is morally required for him to 
endure this painful death. He may know that suicide 
would void insurance policies his family desperately 
requires. or that suicide would cause irreparable emo-
tional damage to his family. On the other hand. there 
may be circumstances in which euthanatic suicide would 
not appear to categorically be a moral wrong. If serious 
financial considerations are not relevant. and if the 
feelings and dispositions of friends and family would be 
only marginally affected. the euthanatic suicide would 
cause grevious social consequences. In certain circum-
stances then. even when third parties are adversely 
affected it would be difficult to characterize the euthan-
atic suicide as morally wrong when a great deal of agony 
and suffering may be avoided. Resolution of the moral 
issue will depend upon the specific circumstances 
involved. 
Very similar to. and perhaps included in. the concept 
of euthanatic suicide is intentional self-destruction to 
avoid debilitating old age. In this situation. the individual 
involved may have led a happy and productive life; but 
with the oncoming of old age and its corrresponding 
severe limitations. the individual may wish to die in 
peace and with dignity. Such feelings may be more 
common today as. with rapid development of medical 
technology. people may be kept alive longer than they 
really desire. 
A much-publicized example of such a suicide was that 
of Dr. and Mrs. Henry P. Van Dusen in early 1975. Dr. 
Van Dusen. the former president of Union Theological 
School. and his wife swallowed overdoes of sleeping pills 
in an effort to carry out a suicide pact. In a suicide note. 
the Van Dusens explained that they had entered a pact 
rather than face the prospect of old age. At the time of 
her death. Mrs. Van Dusen was lame because of an 
arthritic condition. and Dr. Van Dusen had been rendered 
virtually speechless and inactive because of a stroke 
suffered years earlier. 
Otherwise. the Van Dusens were not in such poor 
health as to be facing impending death. However. both 
the Van Dusens had been vigorous scholars. and their 
recent physical handicaps had totally deprived them of 
the useful and active lives to which they had become 
accustomed. With only the prospect of slow deterioration 
for the future. they decided they would die together 
rather than face enfeebling old age. 
As with any suicide. a suicide to avpid debilitating old 
age such as the Van Dusens does not appear to be 
morally wrong if there are no significant social con-
sequences. If the suicide does not adversely affect 
anyone else. then it is difficult to see why the act is 
wrong in itself. On the other hand. if the suicide does 
somewhat injure third persons. it appears that again a 
balancing process is required to weigh the benefits 
sought by the suicide against the supposed adverse 
effects suffered by third parties. As with euthanatic 
suiCide. there does appear to be some legitimacy and 
justification for suicide to avoid debilitating old age. It is 
natural for one to wish to die in dignity; many people 
accustomed to active useful lives would not relish the 
idea of years of a demeaning and meaningless existence 
as one merely a burden upon others. Perhaps in certain 
situations these considerations would outweigh any 
slight discomfort or embarassment suffered by friends or 
family of the suicide. The moral evaluation must be 
determined upon consideration of the specific circum-
stances involved. 
Man's attitudes on suicide have varied drastically over 
the centuries. usually according to socilH:ultural factors. 
The concept of intentional self-destruction has been 
categorically condemned on the one hand. and accepted 
and approved of as part of a social code on the other. 
Perhaps only two basic conclusions can be reached 
concerning suicide: First of all. because of its extreme 
and permanent characteristics. suicide does not appear, . 
to be effectively subject to man's legal systems. Second. 
because of its complexity. suicide does not appear to be 
effectively subject to moral generalizations. The morality 
of suicide can only be judged in specific factual situations 
after careful consideration of the personal reasons and 
social consequences involved. 
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SeDli-Student 
Bargaining 
Recent expansion in public sector employment has 
been accompanied by increased collective bargaining. 
This surge in unionization has resulted from man-
agement's failure. through its dogged adherence to an 
absolutist management ethic. to perceive employees' 
changing economic and attitudinal needs. This failure. 
coupled with recent legislative enactments recognizing 
public sector bargaining rights. has fostered union 
growth and is assuring its institutional legitimacy. ' 
Accompanying this growth in public sector unioniza-
tion have been the efforts by ind}viduals not traditionally 
regarded as employees to improve their status by col-
lective bargaining. Graduate Assistants. Medical Interns 
and Residents. in particular, although enjoying a dual 
"student employee" status. have sought collective 
representation as a means of improving their professional 
and economic standing. To date, employer reception to 
such bargaining has generally been hostile on the bases 
that Assistants. Residents and Interns are not "em-
ployees" as defined in state public employment laws. or 
if "employees." they lack a sufficient community of 
interest to warrant independent organization or inclusion 
in faculty or hospital bargaining units. Management's 
consistent and adamant opposition, however. has not 
successfully checked bargaining attempts. Assistants 
and Interns are increasingly unionizing as their numbers 
and disaffection with management grow. 
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. ASSISTANT, INTERN AND RESIDENT GROWTH 
Graduate Assistants. Medical Interns and Residents 
exist in substantial numbers both absolutely and relative 
to university and hospital staffs. At the University of 
Wisconsin there are now more than 1.800 Teaching 
Assistants. 2 while the Universities of Indiana and Mi-
chigan respectively have 1.7003 and 2.2004 Graduate 
Teaching and Research Assistants. These numbers are 
steadily increasing as is the proportion of Graduate 
Assistants to faculty members. At Fordham University 
there are now 150 Assistants to 501 instructors5 and 
Adelphi University has 125 Assistants to a staff of 338.8 
The size of Intern and Resident classes is likewise 
substantial. At a recent medical conference in Washing-
ton, D.C. attendant spokesmen represented 18.000 of 
thenation's 56.000 Interns and Residents, indicating 
their national strength. 7 Comparatively. their numbers 
are equally significant. as is evidenced by the University 
of Michigan Hospital Center where 650 Interns. Re-
sidents and Post-Doctoral Fellows compare with 300 
staff physicians.s These numbers of Graduate Assistants. 
Medical Interns and Residents indicate their extent of use 
by management as well as potential bargaining strength. 
However. numbers alone do not dictate degree of un-
ionization. Much of the current impetus behind Assis-
tant. Intern and Resident collective bargaining stems 
from increased numbers coupled with imbalances among 
these individuals' acaderr.ic qualifications, assigned 
duties and professional status. 
GRADUATE ASSISTANT UNREST 
The graduate Assistantship is a university program 
designed to attract top doctoral candidates by providing 
them stipends and free or reduced tuition. Universities' 
use of this program increases with undergraduate class 
size. education costs and emphasis on teaching as an 
aspect of graduate development. Therefore, when in-
creased enrollment necessitates additional teachers, the 
Assistants, commanding a mere $2,650 per year,9 are 
seen as an inexpensive and eager source of manpower. 
Their eagerness stems from pr-obable interest in college 
teaching careers and the belief that graduate teaching 
experience will bolster their chances in a dwindling job 
market. On these bases it is not surprising that at ~ome 
universities virtually every underclassman has Graduate 
Assistant instructors or discussion leaders. 
In return for their modest compensation Graduate 
Assistants are expected to provide substantial and sig-
nificant services. Educators differ as to the exact nature 
of such services, with some contending Assistants should 
not teach but merely aid the university educational 
community.'o Ideally this may be desirable, but in 
actuality the Assistants often bear the full burden of 
instruction. As expressed by educator Harold Taylor in 
Students Without Teachers: The Crisis in the University: 
"The fact that they (ASSistants) do not yet possess 
teaching credentials and higher degrees cannot disguise 
the fact that they are already functioning' as teachers 
regardless of faculty status . . ." As teachers, the 
Assistants have iI quasi-professional interest in the facets 
of educational policy which affect their activities. How-
ever, as most universities characterize them exclusively 
as students, they have no imput into the educational 
process. 
In addition to teaching, Assistants are typically as-
signed the less desirable tasks of recording class atten-
dance, grading daily assignments and preparing labora-
tory experiments. The impact of these onerous assign-
ments on the highly qualified Assistants has been great. 
As powerfully described by W. M. Wise: 
"I must report that, with a handful of exceptions. the 
morale of these Teaching Assistants is low. They believe 
they are being exploited by their institutions to meet the 
press of expanding undergraduate enrollments. They 
report they get linle help from senior faculty members on 
the teaching problems they ancounter. They seldom 
report that they are treated as young colleagues by 
members of the regular faculty; instead, more frequently 
they report feeling that they are treated as individual. of 
low status em~loyed to do the work that no one else 
wants to do:" 
Unable to reconcile their considerable talent and teach-
ing responsibilities with menial chores, low pay and lack 
of professional legitimacy, Graduate Assistants are in-
creasingly unionizing. 
ff Graduate assistants 
are increasingly unionizing" 
GRADUATE ASSISTANT BARGAINING 
Already Assistants at three major universities are 
collectively bargaining through representative associa-
tions. In 1971 the Teaching Assistants' Association at 
the University of Wisconsin gained recognition as the 
exclusive negotiating representative of its Graduate 
Assistants. 12 In April, 1974 the University of Michigan 
Teaching Assistants overwhelmingly selected the 
Graduate Employees Organization as the exclusive agent 
for that University's 1,600 Teaching Assistants.'3 
Teaching Assistant bargaining has also become a reality 
at the University of California at Berkley. '4 The fact that 
Assistants at these schools have successfully bargained 
while others have failed" reflects the misunderstanding 
of the Assistants' legal status as "employees' under state 
public employment laws. This misunderstanding is also 
jeopardizing Intern and Resident bargaining attempts 
which increase with their numbers and growing disset-
isfaction with hospital management. 
INTERN AND RESIDENT DISSATISFACTION 
Hospitals offer Internships and Residencies to highly 
qualified medical school gra~uates to provide new phy-
sicians with clinical experience and the opportunity to 
develop specialized expertise. In return for this sponsor-
ship, the Interns and Residents provide the hopitals with 
valuable medical services in such areas as emergency 
room treatment, surgical assistance and outpetient care. 
The extent of these medical services is greet, as Re-
sidents and Interns devote 75 to 90 per cent of their 
working time to providing patient care,18 with the 
remaining period of classroom or seminar training always 
subordinate to the medical needs of their patients. 
In spite of their excellent academic credentials and the 
professional level of medical services they provide, 
Interns and Residents characteristically suffer from in-
adequate pay and poor working conditions. Interns and 
Residents average between $10,000 and $14,000 per 
year,17 which is modest in light of their hours of work 
which often exceed 100 per week.'8 The physical rigors 
of these long work days are further compounded by what 
Interns and Residents protest are inadequate equipment 
and support personnel. Increasingly convinced that their 
compensation is not comm4msurate with their training 
and responsibilities and that improper scheduling and 
inadequate hospital facilities impair effective medical 
treatment, Residents and Interns have sought relief in 
collective bargaining. 
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INTERN AND RESIDENT BARGAINING 
To date. several of these bargaining attempts have 
been successful. Since 1972 the Committee of Interns 
and Residents has bargained for those individuals at New 
York City Hospital. 19 In 1973 the Intern and Resident 
Association at the University of Michigan Medical Center 
was 'recognized as the exclusive representative of that 
hospitals' Interns. Residents and Post-Doctoral 
Fellows. 20 
In May. 1975. the Interns and Residents at Chicago's 
Cook County Hospital voted 41 9 to 4 in favor of repre-
sentation by the Cook County Housestaff Association21 
Finally. during an October. 1975 Conference of the 
Physicians National Housestaff Association in Washing-
ton. D.C .• representatives of 1 B.OOO 'Residents and 
Interns voted overwhelmingly to convert their profes-
sional organization into a bargaining union. 22 In spite of 
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these numerous successes. Intern and Resident union-
ization continues to draw strong management opposition 
for the same .reasons as bargaining by Graduate Assis-
tants: Interns and Residents are regarded as students. 
not employees. and therefore cannot collectively bargain. 
PUBLIC EMPOYEE LEGISLATION 
Whether Interns. Residents and Graduate Assistants 
are employees with bargaining rights or students without 
recourse depends on their status under state public 
employment laws. Examination of public employment 
legislation discloses that only two states have specific 
provisions prescribing Intern and Assistant bargaining 
status. North Carolina has effectively. though undesira-
bly. resolved the controversy through express prohibition 
of all public employee collective bargaining. 23 At the 
opposite end of the spectrum. Iowa in 1974 enacted 
legislation specifically establishing Assistants. Interns 
and Residents as public employees with bargaining 
rights. 24 In the remaining 48 states the status of these 
individuals is much less settled. To date. 15 states are 
without comprehensive public employment laws.25 alth-
ough several have enacted legislation recognizing the 
bargaining rights of specific groups. Of these 1 5 states. 
only Illinois has been confronted with any significant 
bargaining attempts. 28 If the bargaining success of the 
Cook County Hospital Residents serves as any indication. 
then even absent comprehensive legislation bargaining 
may be available in Illinois and the remaining 14 states. 
In states with comprehensive public employment laws 
the status of Assistant. Resident and Intern remains 
surprisingly uncertain because of vague or non-existent 
"public employee" definitions. As a result of this uncer-
tainty. it is becoming increasingly common for bargain-
ing potential to be settled by ad hoc judicial resolution. 
Courts. by careful weighing of student characteristics 
against indicia of employment are determining when 
Assistants and Interns are employees with bargaining 
rights. By general examination of the factors Courts 
consider. and of their application to two recent bargain-
ing attempts by Interns in states with comprehensive 
public employment lesiglation. the ineffectiveness of 
judicial determination becomes evident. 
JUDICIAL WEIGHING 
Attempts to balance "student-employee" characteris-
tics have been repeatedly undertaken by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue and the Courts to determine 
the taxable consequences of stipends paid to Assistants 
and Interns. Traditionally. Graduate Assistants seeking 
exclusion of stipends from taxable income have argued 
that under § 11 7 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code such 
payments are "scholarships" designed to meet educa-
tional expenses. not payment for services rendered. The 
Commissioner. meanwhile. has ruled these payments are 
for services performed and in accordance with §117 (b) 
and has claimed deficiencies on the untaxed stipends. In 
essence. the Assistants contend they are students 
receiving study allowances. while the Commissioner 
argues a taxable employment relation exists between 
Assistant and university. Recent Tax Court cases resolv-
ing this controversy have heavily favored the Commis-
sioner's position in spite of Assistants' arguments that 
"the primary function of the Graduate Assistantship is to 
enable Graduate students to pursue their Graduate 
studies,,27 and that their teaching and research duties are 
primarily personal learning experiences. 
The Assistants' repeated failures to sway the Court are 
largely due to the universities' procedure for selecting 
Graduate Assistants. This selection usually depends on 
the number of unfilled teaching positions rather than the 
availability of qualified applicants. Therefore. in ap-
pointing an Assistant the university is replacing an 
employee it must otherwise hire. On this basis Courts 
infer the Assistant provides substantial and valuable 
service for which his stipend compensates him. Another 
factor mitigating against Assistant success is the ohen 
proportional relationship between his stipend and faculty 
pay for equivalent teaching. This relation leads the 
Courts to infer that the Assistant is being compensated 
by his stipend. 
There have also been numerous cases involving taxa-
tion of Resident and Intern stipends. with the majority of 
cases holding stipends taxable since the hospital-student 
relationship had all the indicia of an employer-employee 
relationship.28 "The almost unanimous conclusion of the 
courts has been that the Intern or Resident was furnish-
ing valuable services to the hospital and that payments 
received by him were compensatory." 29 
In addition to characterizing Interns. Residents and 
Assistants as employees by the taxation of their stipends. 
Courts have examined additional indicia in resolving the 
"student-employee" dichotomy. In Sweet v. Pennsyl-
vania Labor Relations Board. 322 A. 2d 362 (1974) the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court identified characteristic 
traits of an employer-employee relationship: " ... (w)hen 
a party has a right to select the employee. the power to 
discharge him and the right to direct both the work to be 
done and the manner in which such work will be done .. 
. " such a relationship exists. As the university and 
hospital clearly have such power over the selection. 
retention and supervision of Assistants. Interns. and 
Residents. a strong case for such an employer-employee 
relationship can be made. 
The degree of responsibility accorded the Assistant. 
Intern and Resident also has bearing on their status as 
students or employees. Employers contend that too little 
responsibility carries the presumption that teaching and 
medical ministering by such persons are primarily learn-
ing exercises rather than services for which they are paid. 
Courts. however. have adopted more flexible standards 
and find that. where Assistants and Interns have more 
than minimal responsibility. arguments holding them 
"students" for lack of responsibility are largely specious. 
Finally. where Assistants. Interns and Resident par-
ticipate with faculty and hospital staffs in employment 
fringe benefits. their case for "employee" status is 
strengthened. Such benefits include but are not limited 
to: accumulation of annual and sick leave. selective 
service reemployment rights. social security withhold-
ings. and coverage by life insurance. hospitalization. 
workmen's compensation and pension plans. 
Consolidation of these numerous "employee" charac-
teristics lends considerable credence to the argument 
that Assistants. Residents and Interns are employees 
capable of bargaining under or absent state public 
bargaining provisions. Rarely. however. do individuals 
possess all of these employment elements. which ac-
counts for the conflicting Court determinations of Intern 
and Assistant bargaining status. Examination of two 
similar Intern and Resident bargaining attempts in states 
with comprehensive public employment legislation illus-
trate this divergence. 
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MICHIGAN INTERNS BARGAIN 
In March, 1970 members of the University of Mi-
chigan Intern-Resident Association sought recognition by 
the University's Regents as bargaining representative for 
that school's Interns, Residents and Post-Doctoral Fel-
lows. Following rejection of this request on the basis that 
they were "students," The Association petitioned the 
Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) for 
a certification election. hi March, 1971 MERC acceded 
to this request, identifying the University of Michigan as 
a public employer and the Interns and Residents public 
employees under the Public Employment Relations Act. 
(PERA).3o In January, 1972, the Court of Appeals 
rejected MERC's holding on the basis that as the PERA 
did not define "employee" to include Interns and Re-
sidents, they were presumed to be excluded.31 
Final resolution of the controversy came in a February, 
1973 State Supreme Court hearing of the Regents of the 
University of Michigan v. Michigan Employment Rela-
tions Commission case, 398 Mich. 98, 204 N.W. 2d 
218 (1973). In this decision the Court reversed the Court 
of Appeals verdict and found the Association members 
were within PERA's "entire public sector of em-
ployment" purview. The Michigan Supreme Court based 
this determination largely on the employment character-
istics of the Association members. Pointing to their 
hospitalization benefits, receipt of W-2 employee with-
holding forms and regular payment schedule, the Court 
found that Interns and Residents were employees. In 
addition, the Court found a strong argument for em-
ployment in the loyalty oath required of Interns and 
Residents prior to their appointment. As this oath was 
one required by Michigan law of all employees, the Court 
felt the Regents, in administering it, considered an 
employer-employee relation existed. Finally, the Court 
identified the numerous and substantial patient care 
services performed by Association members during more 
than three-fourths of their working time as indications of 
their employment status. 
The aftermath of this judicial balancing was that the 
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University of Michigan Intern-Resident Association was 
determined to be a public employee organization under 
Michigan's PERA and became exclusive representative of 
more than 650 Interns, Residents and Post-Doctoral 
Fellows. 
PENNSYLVANIA INTERNS FAIL 
In the second case, Wills Eye Hospital v. Pennsylvania 
Labor Relations Board 15 Pa. 532, 328 A. 2d 539 
(1974). Intern and Resident bargaining attempts were 
less successful. In November, 1971 the Philadelphia 
Association of Interns and Residents (PAIR) petitioned 
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) for a 
representative election to certify PAIR as the exclusive 
bargaining representative of Interns, Residents and 
Clinical Fellows at Albert Einstein, Temple University, 
and Wills Eye Hospitals. After initially dismissing the 
petition in 1972, the PLRB vacated that order and held 
an election which PAIR won. The Hospitals appealed this 
certification to the Philadelphia County Court of Common 
'Pleas, which in 1973 supported the PLRB ruling. 32 
In upholding the PLRB ruling, the court found that the 
individuals concerned enjoyed many incidents of em-
ployment, including the devotion of 85-90 per cent of 
their time to patient care, and the payment of taxes on 
their stipends. Additionally, Interns and Residents shared 
in medical, life and malpractice insurance, parking, 
cafeteria and laundry privileges, and coverage by work-
men's compensation. Finding that the Interns and Re-
sidents performed services integral to the hospitals.' 
function which could not be terminated without serious 
disruption the Court held that they were clearly 
employees. 
In Decemeber, 1974, against the weight of convincing 
PLRB and Common Pleas Court arguments, the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court in the Wills Eye Hospital 
case, ruled Interns and Residents were not public em-
ployees, thereby stripping PAIR of its representative 
status. In reversing, the Commonwealth Court held 
Interns and Residents were "fulfilling educational aspir-
ations in their service at the respective hospitals and that 
the status of student is incompatible with the status of 
public employee".33 
While PAIR, in February, 1975, obtained an appeal to 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the chance for reversal 
is uncertain at best. Moreover, the fact that the recent 
Commonwealth ruling so authoritatively opposes the 
Michigan position despite strong case similarities: com-
mon employee characteristics of the Interns, com-
prehensive-yet defined public emplov'T!ent legislation. 
and approval of bargaining by both states' labor boards. 
indicates continued piecemeal judicial determination is 
inadequate. 
CONCLUSION 
Numerical growth coupled with a militancy borne of 
desperation is prompting Graduate Assistant. Intern and 
Resident bargaining attempts. Tired of working long 
hours under inadequate conditions for grossly. in-
adequate wages. these student-employees have seized 
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Thermal Efficiency Standards 
for Buildings 
Recent events indicate that thermal efficiency stan-
dards for new building construction will become a reality 
in the not-too-distant future. The United States is cur-
rently embarking on a campaign for the judicious and 
efficient use of our energy resources. The spearhead of 
this campaign is the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act.' 
Included in this new energy act is a provision which 
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John L. Carver 
urges states to adopt (presumably through the use of the 
state "police powers" via building codes) energy con-
servation plans which include thermal efficiency stan-
dards for new building construction. 2 Such standards, if 
promulgated, could mandate minimum insulation stan-
dards and regulate building design and location in order 
to aSSure at least minimal thermal efficiency and resul-
tant energy savings. Practically speaking, this means that 
it may no longer be permissible to construct a building 
which is esthetically pleasing to the builder but energy 
inefficient. In addition, even if the design is satisfactory, 
the builder may well discover that building costs are 
drastically increased. Insulation, as well as other con-
struction materials and requirements necessary to build 
the desired structure in a thermally efficient manner, 
could cause such increases. Failure to meet the thermal 
efficiency standards in the applicable building code could 
result in either the denial of a building permit for con-
struction, or the imposition of fines, or the demolition of 
a structure. All of this could mean that a home at the 
price and of the design an average American can afford 
may become increasingly difficult for many Americans to 
acquire. 
this Practically speaking, 
means that it may no longer be 
permissible to construct a 
bUIlding which is aesthetically 
pleasing to the bUIlder but 
energy inefficient 
The new Energy Policy and Conservation Act places 
the burden of establishing and monitoring such thermal 
efficiency standards on the individual states. This is a 
proper state role in that thermal efficiency standards can 
best be classified as a "police power" exercise. The best 
and perhaps only Virginia authority for establishing and 
enforcing thermal efficiency standards is the Virginia 
State Board of Housing, which under Va. Code Ann. 36 
§97 et. seq. was given authority for the establishment of 
a uniform statewide building code. Persuant to this 
legislative mandate, the Virginia State Board of Housing, 
on January 29, 1973, adopted by reference the Building 
Officials and Code Administrators, International, Inc. 
code (hereinafter B.O.C.A.).3 The B.O.C.A. code, like 
most other codes known to this writer, does not in any of 
its sections make provision for or reference to insulation 
standards or general thermal efficiency requirements. 
The absence of such a provision is probably due to 
traditional theory and precedents for the exercise of the 
police powers, through which the building code was 
developed to insure building construction which was 
consistent with public safety and health.4 
Thermal efficiency standards are principally related to 
a desire to make wise and efficient use of energy re-
sources. Though this desire is laudable, it is not so 
necessary to protect the public health or safety as to 
withstand a strict construction of constitutional stan-
dards. The case law reveals, however, that there is a 
substantial precedent. through the liberal definition of 
the term "welfare," for establishing thermal efficiency 
standards. 
ENFORCEMENT 
In a 1949 case, the Washington Supreme Court said 
that. 
The state. in the exercise of its (POlice) power to enact 
laws for the general welfare of its people. may enact laws 
designed to increase the industries 01 the state. . . and 
add to its wealth. 5 
As the court in this case indicates, it is proper for a 
state to exercise its "police powers" in order to promote 
the economic and social advancement of a state. e The 
stated purposes of the new Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act are as follows: 
Sac. 361. (a) The Congrass finds that-
(1) the developmant and implementation by States 01 
laws. policies. programs. and proceduras 10 conserva and 
to improve efficiency in the use 01 anergy will have an 
immediate and substantial effect in raducing the rate 01 
growth 01 energy demand and in minimizing the adverse 
social. economic. political. and environmental impacts of 
increasing energy consumption; 
(2) the development and implementation 01 energy 
conservation programs by States will most efficiently and 
effectively minimize any adverse economic or em· 
ploymant impacts 01 changing patterns of energy use and 
meet local economic. climatic. geographic. and other 
unique condjtions and requirements of each State; and 
(3) the Federal Government h.s a responsibility to 
foster and promote comprehensive energy CO"88N8tion 
programs and practices by establishing guidelines for 
such programs and providing overall coordination. tech-
nicel assistance. and linancial .u~port lor specific State 
initiatives in energy conservation. 
Clearly the objectives enumerated in this act fall within 
the sco~e of the "police power" as discussed in State v. 
Dexter:. 
Conservation of natural resources has long been 
recognized as a legitimate police power function. In 
1957 an Ohio court of appeals stated that "the conser-
vation of natural resources is within the so-called 'police 
power' of the state. ,,9 The Ohio court's opinion clearly 
follows the dictate of the U.S. Supreme Court in City of 
Trenton v. New Jersey in which the court held that it is 
the duty of a state to conserve naturel resources. 'O In 
1970 the Mississippi Supreme Court clearly adopted this 
viewpoint when it held that 
There can no longer be any doubt as to the power of 
the state to regulate and promote the utilization 01 natural 
resources subject only to the requirements that such 
regulations be reasonable and not in contravention 01 the 
Constitutional provisions. 11 
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A long line of cases hold that states may exercise the 
police powers to prevent the waste of their resources. 12 
Possibly this line of cases should be distinguished from 
. the issue presently under consideration. The thermal 
efficiency standard for buildings imposed through the 
use of state "police power" related to the use of energy 
resources regardless of the source of their origin of 
extraction. The Rne of cases cited. however. if narrowly 
construed deals only with resources actually extracted 
within the jurisdiction of the state deciding the case. 
Hence. it is possible to distinguish this line of cases from 
thermal efficiency regulation which seeks to regulate the 
use of resources regardless of the point of extraction. 
A more general analysis of the scope of the "police 
powers." without regard specifically to the regulation of 
resources. will reveal .that the establishment of thermal 
efficiency standards is within the currently recognized 
scope of the "police powers". In 1 959. the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court stated that 
The lerm "police power" comprehend. the power to 
make and enforce all wholesome and reasonable laws 
and regulations necessary to the mainleinence. upbuild-
ing. and advancement of the public _al and the pr0-
tection of the public inlerest. It is plastic in its nature. and 
will expand to meet the ectual requirements 01 an ad-
vancing civilization and adapt itseH to the necessities of 
moral, senilery, economic and political condition.. No 
principle in our system 01 govemment will limit the right 
01 govamment to respond to public need and protect the 
public _Hare. ,3 
The limit of a state's exercise of the "police powers" is 
reached when a regulation transcends public necessity.'· 
To determine if thermal efficiency standards promulgat-
ed for the achievement of energy conservation transcend 
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public necessity, the courts will have to determine if the 
enactment in question has for its goal the prevention of 
some offense or manifest evil which could undermine the 
preservation of the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare. 16 It is also important to note that the 
term "general welfare" includes the power of a state to 
"enact laws designed to increase the industries of the 
state ... and add to its welfare."'· 
As can be seen. terms such as "transcends public 
necessity" and "general welfare" are flexible and have 
evolved over time to remain responsive to the real or 
perceived needs of an advancing society. As the federel 
Energy Policy Conservation Act indicated, our society 
perceives that there is a need to conserve energy in order 
to assure the future industry and economic wellbeing of 
the nation. This legislative determination of the nation's 
needs will not be lightly disregarded by the Judiciary. 
The Supreme Court's attitude toward regulations which 
reflect the needs of society is evident in the following 
statement. "Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary 
restraint. not immunity from reasonable regulations and 
prohibitions imposed in the interests of the 
community.,,17 
This is the test of reasonableness the courts will apply 
to the proposed thermal efficiency standards for build-
ings, since there seams to be nothing arbitrary about 
such regulations. They are in the interest of the public 
and do not transcend the public necessity, as the neces-
sity is apparent. The inescapable conclusion is. therefore. 
that there will be little or no legal difficulty in establishing 
thermal efficiency standards for buildings as an exercise 
of the state "police powers" through the use of building 
codes. 
THE MEANS AND THE ENDS 
As a general principle, probably everyone favors wise 
and efficient energy use. In the abstract, few would 
dispute the advantage of proper construction and in-
sulation procedures to assure at least minir:nal levels of 
thermal efficiency. However, a practical public analysis 
of the specific legal means necessary to ensure this 
efficiency, with extrapolation as to the ultimate results, 
would undoubtedly cause some degree of public 
consternation. 
As has been discussed, there is sufficient legal 
precedent for the use of building codes to promulgate 
thermal efficiency standards; but the price for the use of 
such building code standards may be increased con-
struction costs and resultant reduced availability of 
affordable housing for low income groups. This apparent 
disadvantage is mitigated by the fact that those who find 
it possible to purchase housing, even at increased cost, 
will be able to heat and cool such structures because of 
their thermally efficient construction. In the long term, 
such thermal maintenance cost sevings will probably 
exceed initial construction cost increases. 
There is, however, another more important, if less 
obvious, "price" for the use of building codes for 
achieving thermal efficiency. As with every new or 
expanded exercise of the "police powers," there is a 
direct loss of individual freedom of action. A very strict 
thermal efficiency standard, enforced through building 
codes, could mandate that architectural design be 
regulated. In addition to insulation standards, an archi-
tectural design containing large amounts of glass or 
cathedral ceilings may be suspect. To receive approval 
for such an architectural design, compromises may 
become necessary. The owner (builder) may be forced to 
use only insulated glass with a type of thermal or in-
sulated curtain inside which will reduce heat loss in cold 
periods, or heat buildup in hot periods. The maintenance 
of special glass and curtains would have to be monitored, 
on a continuing basis. through the use of housing codes. 
One can hypothesize a situation where a building permit 
wOuld be denied until design revision was made remov-
ing all large windows from the north side of a building. 
An extreme situation could arise where a building permit 
would be denied for construction of a thermally inef-
ficient building in a location subject to harsh thermal 
conditions, such as a windswept mountaintop. Certainly 
a structure could be constructed which would, despite 
the harsh conditions of the location, be thermally ef-
ficient. But what would such a structure look like? 
Perhaps it would be a squatty, windowless structure 
half-buried in the ground! No doubt such extreme results 
are unlikely, but they do point out some of the potential 
problems with using building codes in order to achieve 
thermally efficient buildings. 
An alternative to the building code approach is found 
in the well-established system of tax incentives and 
"penalties". It is beyond the scope of this article to 
elaborate on the precise manner in which this could be 
accomplished. The major argument against such a sys-
tem is that the rich could still make inefficient use of 
energy if they paid the penalty, and that tax methods 
place the burden of energy conservation on the poor. 
But. as has been previously indicated, the less affluent 
would be benefitted economically by achieving thermal 
efficiency. First. they would receive significant tax sav-
ings through compliance. Second. there would be sig-
nificant financial savings through reduced fuel costs 
based on reduced consumption effectuated by the con-
struction of a thermally efficient structure. 
There is another advantage of the tax method as 
compared to the "police power" building code method. 
The tax method can be used to retrofit existing inefficient 
structures through tax incentives. The code method 
would be severely restricted in regard to existing struc-
tures; political. legal, and constitutional problems would 
undoubtedly make retrofit infeasible. The building code 
method would have to grant a "non-conforming use" to 
existing inefficient structures and be limited to acting 
only upon future construction (as does the new energy 
act cited herein). 
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the tax incentive 
method is the possibility of large scale retrofit of existing 
thermally inefficient structures. Tllis benefit is important 
because existing housing has a relatively long life ex-
pectancy; hence it will not be rapidly replaced by new, 
efficient structures. Under the building code system, 
without retrofit potential. it could be 50 to 100 years 
before a majority of presently existing housing could be 
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replaced by thermally efficient new construction. Under 
a tax incentive system, a large percentage of all struc-
tures could be made energy efficient within the near 
future. The percentage of buildings which could be made 
thermally efficient, and the time frame in which this 
could be accomplished, would be functions of the benefit 
derived by the tax incentive and corresponding tax 
detriment imposed for failing to retrofit. 
The future will hold thermal efficiency standards for 
new buildings, for the promotion of thermal efficiency to 
save fuel is desirable. The use of the building code to 
implement thermal efficiency goals is the method most 
likely to be employed. However, the building code 
method has the potential for very real problems, the 
restriction of individual freedom and the lack of retrofit 
potential being perhaps the most serious. The tax incen-
tive method is less complex, more equitable, econ-
omically feasible, ,and consistent with maximizing fuel 
savings in the shortest possible period of time. The 
United States needs to save energy today. To wait 50 
years for the presently existing thermally inefficient 
structures to be replaced by new efficient construction 
may be to wait too long. By then the resultant energy 
savings that are the benefit of thermally efficient build-
ings may have arrived too late to effectively conserve our 
fuel resources. 
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(c) Each proposed State energy conservation plan to be eligible 
for Faderal 8IIistance under this pert shall include-
(4) mandatory thermal efficiency standards and insulation 
requirements for n_ and renovatad buildings (except buildings 
owned or leased by tha Unitad States); and . 
3. The Uniform Statewide 8uilding Code of Virginia consists of the 
following: 
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tive Supplement 1972. 
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Supplement 1 972. 
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6. 1974 Accumulative Supplement to Virginia Uniform 
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